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A Theory of Environmental Risk Disclosure*
Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné†, Estelle Gozlan‡
Résumé / Abstract
La réglementation des risques environnementaux met de plus en plus
l’accent sur l’information et la responsabilisation des parties prenantes. Le succès
de cette approche repose toutefois largement sur la qualité de l’information
fournie par les entreprises visées. Cet article porte sur la quantité et la qualité de
l’information qui serait volontairement fournie à une partie prenante par un
pollueur potentiel. On trouve que cette information sera moins précise lorsque la
partie prenante est confiante (voire naïve) a priori, que le coût d’analyse de
l’information livrée croît avec la complexité de celle-ci, ou que le revenu attendu
par une entreprise se révélant être en non conformité est petit. En revanche, une
partie prenante inquiète et un faible coût de production de données précises
encouragent la livraison d’une information de meilleure qualité. La précision de
l’information livrée permet à une firme sûre de se distinguer d’autant plus
facilement d’une firme dangereuse que son revenu ex post est relativement plus
élevé. À la lumière de notre modèle, on examine en terminant plusieurs principes
se rapportant au design des programmes publics de révélation des risques à la
santé et à l’environnement.
The regulation of environmental risks increasingly emphasizes the
awareness and empowerment of stakeholders. The success of this approach,
however, seems to depend crucially on the quality of environmental disclosures.
In this paper we investigate the amount and quality of the information that would
be voluntarily delivered to some stakeholder by a potential polluter. We find that
information may be hazier when the stakeholder is confident (or naive) a priori,
the cost of analyzing the received reports increases little with their complexity, or
a polluter’s net expected payoff from undertaking an industrial activity that would
turn out to be unsafe is small.  A worried stakeholder and a low cost of producing
more accurate figures, on the other hand, may favor disclosure of high-quality
information. By delivering information of very good quality, safe firms can set
themselves apart more easily from the dangerous ones the higher the relative ex
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post payoff from their current industrial activity. The implications of this
framework for the scope and design of public programs of environmental
disclosure are briefly examined.
Mots Clés : Approche informationnelle de la réglementation, jeux de signaux, jeux de
persuasion, études d’impact environnemental
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1. INTRODUCTION
The regulation of industrial risks to human health and the environment relies increasingly on making
the relevant information available to all interested parties. Examples of recent actions in this
direction include government-sponsored right-to-know programs, SEC rules that environmental
liabilities and risks be publicly disclosed, blacklisting of notorious polluters by non-governmental
organizations, and the spreading corporate practice of voluntary environmental reporting. It is widely
believed that such measures constitute an effective and efficient way to have polluters internalize the
potential harms they might inflict on third parties1. For most firms naturally seek the goodwill of
neighboring communities, employees, shareholders, financial institutions, local governments and
citizens in general, especially if losing that goodwill can bear significant financial consequences.
Furthermore, enabling all stakeholders to actively participate in enforcing environmental regulation
may also lower the administrative and political costs of enforcement.
To be successful, however, a regulation of industrial risks based on information disclosure calls for
at least two preconditions. First, the interested parties must have the ability to act quickly and wisely
on the basis of the information they receive. This means in particular that potential victims and
stakeholders can access the judicial system at a reasonable cost and that the latter is effective in
bringing noncompliant polluters back into compliance. Several authors have indeed emphasized the
“institutional complementarity” between informational regulation on the one hand and the legal
empowerment of private parties on the other (see, e.g., Tietenberg and Wheeler [24]). Second, the
information provided must also be of reasonably good quality, considering the costs associated with
producing, disseminating and processing data. From a public policy perspective this raises a number
of positive and normative questions concerning, for instance, the accuracy of firm-specific
information that would be voluntarily disclosed, the level of information provision that would be
socially desirable, and the appropriate extent of mandatory standards for environmental risk
disclosure. This paper seeks to address these questions.
Our theoretical study confronts a potential polluter (say a firm) with some typical stakeholder (say
an activist organization). The former may gather and disclose more or less precise data documenting
the impact of his activity on human health and the environment. The latter may approve or boycott
the activity, given the a priori information she already has and the quality of the additional (firm-
specific) data she receives. This thought-experiment is cast into a simple game of incomplete
information which combines features of signalling games (see, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole
[10]) and of persuasion games (see, for instance, Milgrom [17]). The figures disclosed first act as
a strategic signal of whether or not the activity entails significant hazards to human health and the
environment. At the same time, however, the supplied data convey substantive information
concerning the activity itself : in a decision-theoretic sense they provide one further test that the

1
  The main rationales for this so-called “informational regulation” are presented and discussed in Kleindorfer and Orts
[15], Tietenberg and Wheeler [24], and Sinclair-Desgagné [21]. There is also a young and growing literature that centers
on the effectiveness of public environmental disclosures in various countries (see, e.g., Afsah, Laplante and Wheeler [1],
Bui and Mayer [3], Khanna, Quimio and Bojilova [13, 14], and the current survey by Tietenberg and Wheeler [24]).
stakeholder can use, if she deems it useful, to update her subjective risk assessment. This test would
of course be subject to type I (suggesting to boycott an otherwise safe activity) and type II
(recommending approval of a truly dangerous activity) errors. The probability of not making such
errors, which is usually referred to as the accuracy or precision of the data, formally captures the
quality of the released information.
The accounting and economics literatures offer a number of alternative models of disclosure2. Our
model deals neither with endogenous asymmetric information (unlike De Groote [7]), nor with
costless, nonbinding, non-verifiable communication or cheap talk (unlike Crawford and Sobel [5]),
nor with situations where the cost of disclosure is endogenous (unlike Wagenhofer [28]), nor finally
with competing information channels (unlike Diamond [6]). However, it embodies some central
propositions of those literatures whilst portraying important elements of environmental risk
disclosure. One such element is the fact that voluntary reports on the hazards of complex products
or processes convey strategic intentions (i.e. constitute a signal) as well as hard information. Another
one is that industrial risk assessments must often rely on key firm-specific data that only the potential
polluter himself can deliver. Lastly, the quality of voluntarily disclosed environmental information
is largely demand-driven and dependent upon commonly-known characteristics of the stakeholder,
such as whether she holds a positive or a negative view of the industrial activity, whether and at what
cost she can make sense of the data she receives, and whether she has the ability to pin down any
misleading information.
In the upcoming sections we argue that no additional information would be voluntarily provided to
a confident stakeholder who would readily (and perhaps naively) endorse the activity. This situation
justifies government intervention that could take the form of mandatory disclosures or of an
advertisement campaign to increase public awareness. For a worried stakeholder who openly and
credibly leans towards a boycott may succeed in getting additional data from the potential polluter.
If only truthful information can be disclosed in this case, then the equilibrium under some
circumstances is a pooling one in which reports associated with a safe or with a dangerous activity
convey the same moderately-accurate data3. The quality of information will then be just high enough
to prompt the stakeholder to make one further test based on the received data before taking action.
Under opposite circumstances, however, the equilibrium is rather a separating one in which reports
surrounding a safe industrial activity are so detailed and thus expensive that they cannot possibly be
imitated by a firm dealing with a noxious activity. Whether this outcome is socially preferable to the
previous one will be shown to depend on the firm’s cost of disclosure and the stakeholder’s cost of
analyzing data: under separation, only the firm engaged in the safe activity bears the cost of
providing high-quality data; in the pooling case, however, each firm pays a relatively lower price for
delivering moderately-precise information but the stakeholder must bear the cost of analyzing it.
The paper is organized as follows. The following section contains a description of the basic model.

2
  Representative earlier works include Bowden [2], Dye [8], Hughes [12], Trueman [26], and Verrecchia [27].
3 
  As shown in section 3, this equilibrium satisfies the so-called “intuitive criterion” of Cho and Kreps [4].
Section 3 presents the main results and their interpretation. Section 4 compares these results with
those in the existing literature on disclosure. Section 5 discusses several extensions and additional
policy implications of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2. THE RISK DISCLOSURE GAME
In the standard decision-theoretic framework, a decision-maker who faces uncertain prospects may
choose to act right away or to postpone a decision until additional evidence has been gathered and
	
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the test’s conclusion would be misleading). This probability, which measures the precision or
accuracy of the test, captures in a certain way the quality of the available data. The present model
										 
The outcome is the game pictured in figure 1. In this game a potential polluter (say a firm, ) faces
a stakeholder (say an activist organization,) who may approve or boycott his activity. The former
knows whether this activity would eventually turn out to be harmful (i.e. dangerous) or not (i.e.
safe	 	  	! 					 		 		 	"		 	 
activity is safe.
Insert Fig. 1 about here.
The sequence of decisions by the two players is now as follows. First, the informed firm delivers an
!					!			 	 [0,1]. Upon seeing this report, the
stakeholder may immediately approve (y) or boycott (n) the firm’s activity, or she may decide instead
									
		 		
an examination of the supplied report will yield faithful conclusions – i.e., testing “negative” (-)
when there is indeed nothing to fear and “positive” (+) when the activity constitutes a real threat.
After reaching those conclusions, the stakeholder must finally decide to approve or boycott the firm’s
activity.
The firm who produces and disseminates data of accuracy ß bears a cost f(ß). An immediate boycott
yields status quo incomes to the firm and the stakeholder that are both normalized at 0. Early
approval, on the other hand, yields the firm positive incomes M > 0 and Z > 0 if the activity is
respectively safe or dangerous, while the stakeholder achieves a “good” payoff G > 0 under a safe
activity but a “bad” payoff B < 0 under a dangerous one. When she rather uses the supplied report
as a test and studies it thoroughly, the stakeholder incurs a cost t(ß) that varies upon the complexity
		!			 		#						
firm’s and the stakeholder’s respective cost functions4:
 f() and t() are nonnegative and strictly convex on [0,1].
 f(0.5) = 0 and t(0.5) = 0.
 f(1) > max {M,Z}.
 f(ß) = f(1-ß) and t(ß) = t(1-ß).
The first assumption says that the marginal cost of precision is strictly increasing. The second one
means that any firm can afford the least informative reports (i.e. reports that are as instructive as the
toss of a fair coin). The third one implies that fully accurate reports are too expensive to produce and
disseminate. The last one states, finally, that a report explaining peculiar attributes with some
accuracy would be as expensive to produce and to study as one conveying the opposite attributes
with the same precision.
$		%										 &'safe, dangerous}  [0,1] mapping the
actual nature of the activity into a disclosure quality level. Similarly, the stakeholder’s (pure
behavioral) strategy is made of two rules that map received messages into actions, that is :
K1 : [0,1]  {approve, boycott, test} at the nodes where the report is received, and
K2 : {- , +}  {approve, boycott} at the nodes following the conclusion of a test.
The fact that the stakeholder may remain uncertain about the dangers inherent in the industrial
activity is indicated by the dotted lines; the decision nodes linked together by such lines form the
stakeholder’s information sets. At the time she must choose what to do, the stakeholder may not be
able to distinguish between two different nodes in the same information set. She always holds a
subjective probability distribution over those sets, however. This distribution would of course take
into account the messages received, using Bayes’s rule wherever possible. After getting a report of
	  		 			!		!				
1 	(	) 	(	 ) *+ ) 	,	 ) dangerous)] .       (1)
This subjective probability is updated further to
2(-) = P(safe	(		 1	 *+ 1	 	,	 1 - (2a)
2(+)  = P(safe,	(		 1	 *+ 1	 	,	 1 -	 (2b)

4 
  Any properly scaled, strictly decreasing and concave transformation of the entropy functions of information theory
would satisfy these assumptions. The players’ costs are thereby made proportional to the “informational content” of
reports, in a precise sense.
when the report is analyzed and a negative (2a) or positive (2b) conclusion is reached.
The description of the game is now complete. The following section presents and discusses the main
results of the paper.
3.  MAIN RESULTS
The propositions of this section describe some perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of the risk
		.	 		)/0						+ );(K1(),K2())] such that5:
		 ) maximizes the firm’s expected payoff, given the stakeholder’s strategy (K1(),K2());
(ii) strategy (K1(),K2()) maximizes the stakeholder’s expected payoff, given the potential polluter’s
	 ) and the stakeholder’s current beliefs about the harmlessness of the industrial activity;
(iii) the 	 , 1 	 2 are obtained successively using Bayes’s rule, whenever feasible.
It is not possible, however, to get 1 through Bayes’s rule when the observed precision level, say ,
	 	 	 	 !	 1	  	 	 	 	 	 ) safe) and
) dangerous) must both be zero by definition of an equilibrium. We deal with this well-known
problem by first assuming that the stakeholder will then set her beliefs via forward induction. Under
this mode of reasoning, the stakeholder views any action by the potential polluter as intentional (as
opposed to being the result of some mistake or some technological failure). She thus rules out safety
!		 	%	 				!	!				1	 . Once her beliefs are
updated accordingly, we shall furthermore require that the stakeholder’s payoff-maximizing reaction
be able to deter any such “surprising” (i.e. out-of-equilibrium) accuracy level6.
The equilibria obtained in this manner turn out to be unique modulo two characteristics of the
stakeholder which are defined as follows.
Definition 1. The stakeholder is said to be confident if  ex ante she holds a strictly positive expected
payoff, i.e. if 2	,	 )B > 0. Otherwise, the stakeholder is said to be worried.
Definition 2. The stakeholder is called clairvoyant if she can distinguish between accuracy levels 
	 	3			quasi-clairvoyant when she can only distinguish between accuracy levels that
				 	 		 	 	 	 			 	
			 

5
  See Fudenberg and Tirole [10] for a rigorous definition and complete discussion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium and
its refinements.
6
  This amounts formally to satisfying the “intuitive criterion” of Cho and Kreps [4].
The following subsections now consider the cases of a confident stakeholder and of a worried but
quasi-clairvoyant stakeholder respectively. These cases will act as benchmarks for the upcoming
policy discussion.
3.1  The confident stakeholder
A confident stakeholder endorses the industrial activity a priori.  It is therefore a dominant strategy
									 )  0.5. This readily supports our first result.
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that the stakeholder is confident. Then, at the equilibrium, the potential
polluter always selects an accuracy level of 0.5 and the stakeholder approves the industrial activity.
Proof. It is clearly optimal for the potential polluter to set )  0.5 when the stakeholder approves
	!			4			 		 	(	 	(	56 				
(on the equilibrium path) remain constant since
1	(	 )56*+ )56	,	 )56-	(	 *+ 	,	 -	(	
	 2() 		 1	56*+ 1	56	,	 156-	(	 	
The stakeholder’s payoff from an immediate boycott is 0. And her net expected income from
undertaking a test based on the current report is also
P(-) max[0, 2(-)G + (1- 2(-))B] + P(+) max[0, 2(+)G + (1- 2(+))B]
	(	+ 56	,	 56- G + (1- /	,	+ 56	,	 56- G + (1- /
	(	 G + (1- /
It is therefore optimal for the stakeholder to approve the industrial activity right away7.
Although the formal treatment of this case is rather straightforward, it yields interesting policy
conclusions. For the potential polluter, delivering a report of precision 0.5 is the practical equivalent
of not providing any useful information. Mandating some disclosure might be appropriate in this
case, if one deems the stakeholder to be naïve or ill-informed. As we will now see, however, a
valuable alternative to this approach would also be to instill doubts in the stakeholder’s mind.

Discussing out-of-equilibrium beliefs and best responses is unnecessary here.
3.2  The worried stakeholder
A worried stakeholder needs to be convinced before approving the industrial activity. This attitude
puts pressure on the firm to produce and deliver useful data. Two mutually exclusive outcomes may
now occur. A firm handling a safe activity and one dealing with real hazards may either both disclose
information of the same accuracy – this is the so-called pooling equilibrium, or the quality of their
respective report may differ – which is the so-called separating equilibrium. In the first case, the
stakeholder who is initially skeptical will change her mind only after the conclusion of an ultimate
test increases sufficiently the likelihood that the industrial activity is safe. In the second case, the
worried stakeholder knows right upon observing the quality of the information delivered whether
or not the current industrial activity is safe. These two outcomes clearly bear different social costs.
Which one prevails, however, will be shown to depend on parameters of the model that the regulator
can control.
For the time being, let us suppose that the stakeholder is quasi-clairvoyant, the range of ) is
restricted to the interval [0.5,1], and M is strictly greater than Z. These assumptions will be lifted in
section 5. The latter could depict a situation where the dangerous firm faces significant (uninsurable)
penalties ex post. The second one may capture the fact that the disclosed data are verifiable, so the
potential polluter cannot propose a misleading test. This context yields an intuitive construction of
the equilibrium of the game. Let us start with the following statement. 
LEMMA TO PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that the stakeholder studies the report. Then  (i) 1 = ; and  (ii)
the stakeholder approves the activity if and only if the report tests “negative”, i.e.
K2(-) = “approve” and K2(+) = “boycott” .
Proof. (i) The stakeholder needs to study a report only if she cannot distinguish right away a safe
			!		3			1!		 )  [0.5,1], this can only occur when
	(	 	(	 		$				!	) 	(	) dangerous) by definition. Hence,
1 =  by rule (1).
(ii) First note that the stakeholder would not study the report if her strategy were such that
K2(-) = K2(+) = “boycott” or K2(-) = K2(+) = “approve”, for her expected payoff would then be
respectively –t( 	 	 5	 	 	 	 2	 ,	  /	 7	  	  0. It must therefore be the case that
either K2(-)= “approve” (and then K2(+) = “boycott”)  or  K2(-) = “boycott” (and so K2(+) =
“approve”). By the first part, the stakeholder’s expected payoff from K2(-) = “approve” is 2	,
(1  /	7	  				G462	(	9:			  2	,	  /	7	 	; 	G462(-) =
9!:						 	<	56
Figure 2 now shows the potential polluter’s revenues and costs according to the chosen precision
level, the type of industrial activity and the stakeholder’s decision: the horizontal straight lines
correspond to immediate approval by the stakeholder, whilst the positively and negatively sloped
lines give the firm’s expected payoff when the delivered report is studied and the firm’s activity is
respectively safe or dangerous. The Figure also exhibits three important thresholds.
Insert fig. 2 about here.
The first one, named ß0, satisfies the equation Z-f(ß) = 0; a firm dealing with hazardous products and
processes cannot afford producing data of accuracy higher than or equal to ß0. The second one, noted
ß1, maximizes the function [ßM - f(ß)], which is the firm’s expected profit if the industrial activity
is safe and the stakeholder approves the industrial activity when the report tests “negative”. Finally,
ß2 is the smallest number in the interval [0.5,1] that satisfies the inequalities
ßG + (1- )(1-ß)B - t(ß) <	5 (3)
-(1- )ßB - (1-ß)G - t(ß) < 0. (4)
When 1 =  and these inequalities hold, the stakeholder would prefer to study the report rather than
to respectively boycott or approve the industrial activity right away.
Let ß3 = max{ß1,ß2}. We shall suppose that the thresholds satisfy the following:
 ß3 < ß0  and conditions (3) and (4) are fulfilled for any ß  [ß3, ß0].
 (1- ß3)Z  >  f(ß3) .
The latter assumption entails that the firm whose current activity is dangerous can afford disclosures
that the stakeholder would deem to be worth studying. The former implies that the stakeholder would
first choose to “test” when a reasonable amount of information is disclosed but the nature of the
industrial activity remains ambiguous.
The equilibrium that finally emerges rests on whether or not we have
ß3M- f(ß3) < M - f(ß0) . (5)
When (5) is true, it will be shown that the firm whose activity is safe chooses to signal this by
providing very accurate (and expensive) information. When (5) does not hold, however, the potential
polluter delivers moderately precise data that the stakeholder analyzes before taking action.
PROPOSITION 2. (i) Separating equilibrium: If (5) is satisfied, then the equilibrium has
= 0, 	
	G461 0) = “approve”, K1(0.5) = “boycott.”
(ii) Pooling equilibrium: If the reverse inequality holds strictly in (5), then the equilibrium has
 	
ß3  and  K1 3) = “test”8.
Proof. 	=	 4 be the unique number in [0.5,1] such that (1- ß4)Z  =  f(ß4). And consider now the

8 
  Pooling and separation are both possible equilibria when (5) holds as an equality.
	following beliefs and moves by the stakeholder.
- >	 		 0 - 	 1 	(			G461 	(	9!: , the rationale being that only the firm dealing with
a safe activity can afford producing information of this quality.
- >	 		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also deliver such data and studying the report is the stakeholder’s best action in this case.
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by a test, would benefit only the unsafe firm9.
Given these (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs and moves, and if condition (5) holds, the firm’s and the
stakeholder’s respective actions described in the proposition clearly are best responses to one another
				 156	(	5		 1 0) = 1 are obtained via Bayes’s rule.
(ii)  The equilibrium lays similarly on the following (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs and moves
by the stakeholder.
- >	 		 0 - 	 1 	(			G461 	(	9!:
- >	 		 3 0 	 1 	(	 		G461 	(	9:	 								!	
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a test, would benefit only the unsafe firm10.
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precise enough to indicate whether the activity is safe nor to justify making a costly test.
Under the proposition’s assumption, the stated actions for the firm and the stakeholder clearly are
									 1 3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Figure 2 and the arguments of the proof allow some straightforward yet interesting comparative
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	> 						 			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2			 3) down; this renders a pooling equilibrium and its lower precision level more likely.
)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!		 			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			6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		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				 1 increases. If the
initial equilibrium is already a pooling one, however, cheaper delivery always entails that the quality
of reports is upgraded at the subsequent pooling equilibrium. A decrease in the return Z from the
noxious activity, on the other hand, may raise the right-hand-side of (5) and thus the likelihood that
the highly accurate reports associated with the separating equilibrium occur. If separation is already

9, 10
  This is where the “intuitive criterion” of Cho and Kreps [4] bites.


the outcome, however, it remains so but the quality of the information provided by the safe firm goes
down.  Finally, the overall impact of an increase in the payoffs B, G, M or in the subjective
	 			&		/ 	2 		 	%	?			@	 		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	A	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both sides of inequality (5).
From a public policy standpoint the proposition also makes it clear that, perhaps contrary to
conventional wisdom, more accurate information is not necessarily better. To see this, notice that
the ex ante social benefit of a separating equilibrium is given by
Wsep	(		 +2	,	A	7	ß0)], (6)
whilst the one associated with a pooling equilibrium is equal to11
Wpool = [ ß3(G + M) + (1- )(1-ß3)(B + Z)] – f(ß3) - t(ß3) . (7)
Depending on the respective sizes of the payoffs G, B, M, Z and on the behavior of the cost functions
f(	) and t(	), both Wsep > Wpool  and  Wsep < Wpool are certainly possible. The higher accuracy brought
by a separating equilibrium is therefore not always socially desirable.
Several other policy implications are discussed in section 5. Beforehand the following section will
briefly position the above results within the literatures on disclosure and games of persuasion.
4. RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EXISTING LITERATURE
The presence of the cost functions f(	) and t(	) clearly matters for the previous analysis. Without
these, or equivalently if f(	)  0 and t(	)  0, our model would give way to the well-known
“disclosure principle” of persuasion games (Grossman [11], Milgrom [17], Milgrom and Roberts
[18], Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura [19]): if the stakeholder needs to be convinced,
precision is costless, and the potential polluter cannot lie, then there is an equilibrium where the
latter provides fully accurate information and reveals the true nature of his activity. This equilibrium
would be supported by the usual “sophisticated-skepticism” argument that, in such a context, the
stakeholder completely discounts any partial reporting because she believes that the firm dealing
with a safe activity has no reason to conceal this.
Through propositions 1 and 2, however, our model encompasses another “classical” result due to
Verecchia [27]: positive costs of reporting imply that vague disclosures do not necessarily signal a
bad state of nature, for the specific payoff and cost structure can encourage a safe firm to reveal as
little information as would a dangerous firm.
Reporting costs can easily be linked to the preparation and dissemination of data or to the proprietary

The cost of making a type I error (boycotting a safe activity) does not appear in this formulation.



nature of information. More specifically, the additional feature that the cost of reports increases with
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quality (or of the reliability of any outsider who assesses the environmental impact of the current
industrial activity). Concerning the choice of auditor by an opportunistic firm, Titman and Trueman
[25] argued earlier that the more benign the industrial activity the higher the quality of the auditor,
whilst Hughes [12] showed that a firm’s handling of a safe activity may not necessarily induce higher
auditor quality if there are other means (e.g., ownership in the project) by which the firm could signal
her goodwill. The above analysis brings these opposite conclusions together: according to
proposition 2, cost and payoff functions that satisfy consition (5) induce a monotone relationship
between harmlessness and audit quality, but functions inconsistent with that condition make the safe
as well as the dangerous firm agree on their choice of auditor.
Our model does not address explicitly the timing of disclosures (unlike, for example, the models of
Dye [8], Truman [26], and Teoh and Hwang [23]). As suggested by Verrecchia [27], however, one
may assume that the cost of disclosure decreases with time. Proposition 2 and its comparative statics
implications would now predict that reporting strategies which form a pooling equilibrium become
more attractive but tend to deliver more precise data as time elapses. Once a pooling equilibrium is
at sight, there is therefore an incentive for the regulator to postpone public hearings. But if it is the
separating equilibrium that first shows up and turns out to be socially better, then the regulator will
rather set a deadline at the last time t* where Wpool  Wsep.
In a paper closely related to ours, Fishman and Hagerty [9] investigate the circumstances where it
is desirable to limit further a potential polluter's discretion on disclosures. Our model is of course
analogous to theirs but it takes precision as a continuous variable and, more importantly, brings in
several traits of the stakeholder. This often yields complementary insights: for example, that a
confident stakeholder renders voluntary disclosure unattractive, even to a firm handling a safe
activity; and that if more precision is always desirable in the presence of a worried stakeholder, then
less discretion might be granted to those potential polluters whose lower cost of data production
tends to produce a pooling equilibrium.
Finally, a number of models have recently dealt with the cost of analyzing or acting upon the reports
received. Shin [20], for instance, assumes the stakeholder is uncertain about the exact information
possessed by the potential polluter. This feature is akin to quasi-clairvoyance, although the latter
refers to uncertainty concerning the information delivered by the stakeholder. An advantage of using
this notion in an environmental (by contrast to a financial) disclosure context is that, as we shall see
in the next section, one can get meaningful results without having to make the extra assumption that
the potential polluter never lies. Some costs of decision making are also brought up by Lewis and
Poitevin [16], who deal with type I and Type II errors, and by Stocken [22], who allows specific
retaliatory punishments in a repeated-game setting. Via the function t(	) this paper rather emphasizes
the cost of counter-expertise. This seems to make sense if one wants to examine informational
regulation vis-à-vis environmental risks, for the empowerment of stakeholders that is thereby
pursued hinges to a large extent on the affordability of independent experts.
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5.  FURTHER EXTENSIONS AND POLICY ISSUES
Let us now examine what happens if some of the assumptions made in subsection 3.2 are relaxed.
Suppose, first, that the range of ) is the whole interval [0,1], or in other words that the potential
polluter can deliver misleading information. Two outcomes are now possible. If the stakeholder is
clairvoyant, then the assumed symmetry of the cost function f(	) around 0.5 and arguments similar
to those in the proof of proposition 2 yield four equilibrium candidates – the previous separating
[ß(safe) = ß0, ß(dangerous) = 0.5 ; K1(ß0) = “approve”, K1(0.5) = “boycott”] and pooling ones
[ß(safe) = ß(dangerous) = ß3 ; K1(ß3) = “test” and K2(-) = “approve”, K2(+) = “boycott”], plus their
mirror images with respect to ß = 0.5 :
[ß(safe) = 1-ß0, ß(dangerous) = 0.5 ; K1(1-ß0) = “approve”, K1(0.5) = “boycott”]
[ß(safe) = ß(dangerous) = 1-ß3 ; K1(1-ß3) = “test” and K2(-) = “boycott”, K2(+) = “approve”] .
If the stakeholder is quasi-clairvoyant, however, the pooling equilibrium unravels. To see this, note
that in this case a safe firm’s data could have precision ß3 meanwhile a firm holding a dangerous
activity would never be able to credibly commit not to supply a distorted test of accuracy 1- ß3.
Studying the report received would then yield the stakeholder an expected payoff
32	,	  3/	7	 	"	5
when K2(+) = “boycott” and K2(-) = “approve”, or
 32	,	  3/	7	 	"	5
if K2(+) = “approve” and K2(-) = “boycott”. The only possible candidates for an equilibrium are thus
the two separating outcomes
[ß(safe) = ß0, ß(dangerous) = 0.5 ; K1(ß0) = “approve”, K1(0.5) = “boycott”] , and
[ß(safe) = 1-ß0, ß(dangerous) = 0.5 ; K1(1-ß0) = “approve”, K1(0.5) = “boycott”] .
One interesting implication of these findings is that a looser regulatory context where potential
polluters can delude external stakeholders does not necessarily involve hazier disclosures. The
quality of reports might actually go up (perhaps surprisingly) when the stakeholder is quasi-
clairvoyant, because the safe firm has then no other choice than to distinguish itself from a dangerous
one by providing highly accurate (and expensive) data.
Suppose now that holding a dangerous industrial activity entails greater revenues, i.e. that G < B. If
the potential polluter cannot lie or the stakeholder is clairvoyant, then the only possible equilibrium
under this payoff structure is a pooling one, since a safe firm cannot credibly signal its goodwill12.
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  It appears that no pure-strategy equilibrium exists when G < B, the strategy ß() is free, and the stakeholder is
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In this case a regulator who favors separation between safe and harmful activities might want to
enforce substantial ex post penalties on the dangerous firm; by the above analysis the fine t would
then have to be set so that G > B - t .
Returning to the context of section 3, where G > B, the potential polluter cannot lie and the
stakeholder is quasi-clairvoyant, we shall finally examine some policy issues relating to the
opportunity of mandatory standards and the use of taxes and subsidies.

 Mandatory standards for environmental disclosure
In this paper mandatory standards can be defined as the imposition of a floor level ß > 0.5 on the
precision of reports. Let ß4 = max{ß3 , ß} denote the precision level that is now associated with a
pooling equilibrium. If Wsep > Wpool but pooling is the occurring outcome, then a benevolent
regulator would clearly want to reset ß sufficiently higher than ß3 so that a safe firm finds it attrative
to signal the nature of its activity. The reverse is true in the opposite case where Wsep < Wpool but the
separating outcome prevails; however, putting lower standards ß may not suffice to induce pooling
and the regulator may need to use other instruments as well.

 Taxes and subsidies
Let us consider the effect of adding an amount T to the stakeholder’s cost of analysis t(), a negative
T being interpreted as a subsidy and a positive T as a tax. According to figure 2 and the second
proposition, a subsidy of this sort would increase the likelihood of a pooling equilibrium whilst a tax
would do the opposite. Therefore, if the more precise data of a signalling equilibrium is always
socially desirable, then the regulator should tax independent counter-expertise by the stakeholder.
Considering now the impact of changing the data production cost f() by adding a fixed amount F
to it, it appears that a subsidy F < 0 would decrease, and tax F > 0 increase, the precision levels
associated with both the pooling and the separating outcomes. If the regulator wants to depart from
a separating equilibrium or to improve the quality of information in a pooling situation, then a
subsidy to environmental reporting would be the right instrument to use.
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quasi-clairvoyant.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are circumstances under which an informed potential polluter cannot credibly document and
disclose all his information to every external stakeholder. This paper examined the factors that might
influence the quality of voluntary disclosures in this case. We modelled quality as the precision (in
the usual sense of decision analysis) of a test that would be based on the delivered data. Then we
brought up specific features of the stakeholder, such as her mood (confident or worried), her
perceptiveness (clairvoyance or quasi-clairvoyance), and her cost of analyzing environmental reports,
along with more customary items like the cost of producing and delivering information. Our main
results (propositions 1 and 2) predict that voluntary disclosures would be very vague (thus
inexpensive) when the stakeholder is already confident, but that the necessity to reassure a quasi-
clairvoyant yet worried stakeholder could force a firm to invest in accurate environmental reporting.
These results and the model itself yield a number of implications regarding informational regulation,
some of which are sketched in sections 3 and 5. We showed, for example, that subsidies to
environmental reporting are an imperfect substitute for mandatory disclosure, because they might
allow a dangerous firm to match the quality of the information expected from a safe firm and so look
ex ante as if its current activity were harmless.
Our modelling approach is rather broadlooking and bridges the literatures on signalling and
persuasion games. The model thus seems to fit a wide range of situations and suggests several
possible extensions. A valuable one would be to add a competing source of information, another one
to investigate the formation of prior beliefs by the stakeholder, and another one to consider mixed
strategies as an answer to ambiguity or radical uncertainty. The price to pay for this flexibility,
however, is to have a model that may look too abstract in some settings. An awaited remedy to this
	 	 	 	 	 	 !	 !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attributes of environmental reports.
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